Cry Havoc

Decoding Gen. Mike Minihan's "maverick" remarks on a looming war with China

Air Force Gen. Mike Minihan speaks to a journalist at Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam earlier this month. (Tech. Sgt. Tabatha Arellano)

For the uninitiated, Gen. Mike Minihan, who commands the US Air Force’s Air Mobility Command (AMC), has become a controversial figure recently. A memo to his team back in January was leaked, exposing thoughts ostensibly intended for an internal audience. These included Minihan’s “gut feeling” that war with China was imminent, and that commanders needed to prepare their people to “aim for the head” to contend with this looming threat. It was a bonanza for war fantasists who want a great confrontation. [Or at least think they do.]

When it went viral, this sparked boringly predictable histrionics, with retired generals suggesting Minihan join them out to pasture. A chorus of bleating from naïve lawmakers and pundits barely masked the din of their feverishly wringing hands. It was as though they imagined generals shouldn’t be passionate about readiness, and shouldn’t plan for the worst.

The controversy continues to simmer against a backdrop of uneasy tension with China, vicious Congressional debate over military and defense issues, and large-scale exercises undertaken by Minihan and his command to assure the readiness he considers imperative. [Here’s a good summary.]

Here’s the thing about Gen. Mike Minihan. He is an absolutely fantastic military leader. He leads from a place of principle and conviction. He is authentic. The teams he leads can connect to him easily, as he exposes his soul and makes himself vulnerable. His teams have epic levels of trust and confidence coursing through them. This unlocks the teamwork and discretionary effort elusive in a paycheck-driven, individualist organization.

Over the couple of decades preceding Minihan’s appointment as its commander, AMC was often a revolving door for leaders in transition to other posts, and few of them made a positive mark on the command. There were a couple of strong leaders in there, but Minihan stands out in his capacity to inspire. Friends of mine who continue to serve admire him, and are not only willing to follow him, but feel fortunate for the privilege of doing so. That is extraordinary and rare in the US Air Force.

But more than strictly a commander at this point, I believe Minihan is playing an undeclared but fully authorized role in the intricate unfolding of a complex conversation between the US and China … and between constituencies within the US government.

If we take completely at face value Minihan’s “cry havoc” January memo, it leads some to reasonably ask why this guy is antagonizing China, why he’s sending messages which might unsettle global security, and whether he’s behaving responsibly as a senior member of the US military establishment. These are fair questions.

Let me suggest an alternative premise; that in fact, Minihan’s comments in his internal memo were 100% expected to become public, if not deliberately spirited there. Though I don’t have direct knowledge, I would bet a month’s pay that his memo was coordinated, and therefore his comments were authorized by the Biden Administration. This isn’t a leaked internal memo. It’s deliberate messaging.

I can imagine several possible interests advanced by Minihan’s memo ending up as public and viral as it did. These include but are not limited to:

Making China Self-Interested. If China believes the US sees conflict as inevitable, it will further believe the US is likely to channel resources and readiness to prepare. This will trigger China to reallocate its own resources, making material support for Russia’s war in Ukraine less viable.

Instigating China to Move Next. Let’s assume the two nations are in a delicate dance where each is trying to understand how the other perceives its interests in the relationship, and how willing or eager the other is to escalate toward armed confrontation to protect those interests. In such a dance there are moments of increased ambiguity. In such moments, there is value in getting the other side to make the next move in order to read its strategic intent more clearly and decide our own next steps. If, by escalating its rhetoric in a carefully calibrated way, the US can stir China into a reaction, it might tell us something useful which we can use to accurately rebalance our defense spending and priorities. Shaping the spending choices of an opponent can be decisive. [More on that in a moment.]

Encouraging China to Ratchet Down. In a realist international paradigm, keeping the peace is a matter of maintaining a comfortable balance of power. If one nation believes it is becoming comparatively weak enough to invite aggression from another, it may further conclude aggression is inevitable, and may lash out pre-emptively, while it can benefit from strategic surprise. If the more powerful nation believes a pre-emptive lashing out is imminent, it may take measures to heighten readiness and avoid being surprised. These measures can lead to hypersensitivity regarding the other side’s actions, with misinterpretation potentially sparking war.

If the US sends a message to China that it is heightening military readiness, China may realize it has overplayed its hand, inadvertently behaving in a way that is ratcheting up pressure and making conflict more likely. If, as many believe, China wants to be economically dominant on a global scale, it has an interest in avoiding large-scale conflict which will make its exports more expensive, trigger protectionist movements which reduce demand for its goods, and divert more of its economic output than desired to military spending.

Shaping Chinese Defense Choices. Populist rhetoric would have us believe China’s military spending is rampant, and reflects a clear intent for major conflict. In fact, China spends at about half the level of the US as a percentage of GDP and about one-third in real terms. This hasn’t changed much in the past couple decades.

Military spending as a % of GDP, 1989-2001

If we’d like to disturb this entrenched pattern by catalyzing more investment, or would like to make Chinese defense spending less effective by stretching it across a larger and less precise portfolio, there is value in sending the message that American mobility forces are razor-ready to project mass across the Pacific and hold its interests at risk.

This idea has historical footing. German spending on airpower during the re-armament period prior to WWII was massive but unfocused, creating a large-scale Luftwaffe which lacked in resilience, organization, and the specialization necessary to hold Britain’s maritime forces and industrial base at consistent risk. This permitted Britain to defend itself effectively with a leaner resource base. Had Germany fielded a large fleet of 4-engine bombers and developed a credible maritime patrol force, British resource and logistical calculus might have been influenced in ways that could have changed the outcome. [Credit to Phillips O’Brien and Richard Overy.]

Sustaining US Defense Spending. Both major political parties are bent on continually increasing the level of defense investment in our Federal budgets. Justifying annual budgets inching toward $1T during a time of peace, while other national priorities go begging, is greatly eased by the generic threat of war with a major competitor. Politicians have cynically laid the groundwork over the course of time with stereotypical and xenophobic rhetoric designed to vilify China. Preying on fear is a natural next step in reducing debate about the defense budget, which would invite unwelcome scrutiny threatening the millions of snouts planted firmly in the world’s most prolific public trough.

Having messaging out there that an influential 4-star believes we need to get ready for a big war with China is in pretty much everyone’s interest. It’s one of the few things about which the major political parties totally agree.

Title 18, Section 333 of the US Code makes it illegal to burn or throw money. This hasn’t stopped the US government from burning and throwing away trillions on defense spending, often justified by vague threats of war which prey on fear.

I’ll footnote the idea of creating deterrence here only to discount it.

Deterrence is a unique language designed to manipulate the cost/benefit analysis of a potential adversary. Convincing China that war with the West is more expensive than peace is not necessary, and therefore cannot be the goal of massive mobility exercises adorned with fiery 4-star language.

To believe this is about general deterrence is an oversimplification, and a lithe rhetorical ploy to pave an unbounded future path of runaway spending, fear-mongering, and our-blood-their-guts sabre-rattling from cocktail circuit politicos who couldn’t distinguish a throttle from a thistle. When you hear this word from a politician, grab your wallet.

Having said all that, some clichés become clichés because their essential truth earns them frequent use. Peace does require strength. Being prepared for war is an important part of keeping the peace.

While I’m tired of seeing these axioms sent overhead on flaming arrows to instill fear in our people and believe they have done a lot to bleed our nation’s vitality dry, that doesn’t make them untrue when properly applied in the right context.

It’s clear to me that the last thing Gen. Mike Minihan wants is a war with China. But it’s also clear he understands he can’t wish his way to peace. He gets that this isn’t the kind of problem you let run free on the range. You get close enough to herd it and then you react.

Minihan gets it. And so do those tacitly and explicitly authorizing him to play the role he is playing.

Tony Carr is a retired USAF squadron commander with 15 years experience in the mobility community. He is a graduate of the USAF School of Advanced Air and Space Studies and the USAF Weapons School.