Do these Air Force Inns fall under the installation command or something like the commissary where the civil engineers are restricted from maintenance/repairs? Is that installation commander having to choose between an F-35 squadron hangar or fixing dorms?
Maintenance and small repairs can be made to hotels using the base Civil Engineer labor force. All of these costs are reimbursable from NAF to AF, so in the end the money actually still comes from NAF which has nothing to do with mission execution. Two completely different lots of money. But there is the matter of maintenance technicians time. Do we prioritize 1st line mission facilities or support facilities.
Larger projects are funded exclusively by NAF money. So no mission overlap.
Employees are once again paid through NAF funds. No mission overlap.
So while there’s a slight tension with mx technician time use, the money side is not really in tension.
Basically, the air force just doesn’t want to do it anymore.
The dilemma is unbreakable when we don't have enough people to cover both the mission and key support. We will just be knocking back the alligator closest to the boat.
Yes and no. The dilemma is pretty much what you describe, but the decisions are made way above the installation level. HQ AF decides, for example, to reduce infrastructure maintenance budget, and with that, reduce civil engineer staffing. The installation commander is not shown the detail of these decisions or explained clearly what is happening or why. They are simply told to do their best with what they have. Which leads to endless wheel-spinning and futility.
For about 20 years, the USAF has not trusted installation commanders to make budget trade-offs. The presumption, likely accurate, is that they'd manicure operations to avoid making things impossible for everyone else. Given we do a lot of operating that isn't necessary and yields no upside but do it nonetheless because someone says so, O-6s being handed the reins would potentially reduce waste and free up a lot of money for support.
But we're now talking about a model for budget and ops prioritization that hasn't existed for a long time.
Tony, I find that most of the Air Forces leadership are pilots or other flying status Airmen. Do you think this bias towards operations and flying hours over time has degraded infrastructure and other parts of the Air Force?
I think there's something to it. I don't necessarily buy that it's because too many operators are in charge of support elements. Indeed, the trend after 9/11/01, fueled by Rumsfeld's hare-brained Joint Basing construct, has been support leaders in charge of whole bases with operations just a tenant unit like anyone else. Still, most generals 2-star and above come out of operations.
I think that's good and maybe even essential. Operators know what support they need to deliver. Support personnel don't always appreciate how their activities can boost or impair operations. The USAF's preference for stovepiped organizations has driven supporters further from the conceptual centerline of airpower, and re-drawn the old skirmish line between aviators and everyone else.
The real problem is the USAF promotes too few of the right people to senior roles where decisions requiring a backbone get made. Whether they wear wings or not, they're reaching the highest levels by proving they can politic, which means laying aside principles to adhere to someone else's demands and serve their interests ... even at the expense of the team you're leading.
Chopping infrastructure budgets didn't happen because there were too many pilots at the top. It happened because we promoted people who would say yes every time their string gets pulled. Suddenly they're at boardroom tables deciding how to pay a $100 infrastructure bill with $7-8. In that world, something has to be on fire to get funded. Which is why Al Udeid, for example, had to become a scandal with HASC/SASC sponsorship to get fixed.
You mentioned joint basing as a hare-brained scheme, could you expand? My initial impression is that joint basing, particularly airfields could offer cost savings. If USMC, USN, and USAF are operating their versions of the F35, there could be opportunities to offer improved maintenance and operational infrastructure. In my mind, joint Army and USMC bases could share live fire ranges, more manpower for maintenance and training, and joint training opportunities.
Do you find fault in support leaders maintaining installations while operational units focus on their own training and readiness? Could you expand on your experiences there?
Maintenance and small repairs can be made to hotels using the base Civil Engineer labor force. All of these costs are reimbursable from NAF to AF, so in the end the money actually still comes from NAF which has nothing to do with mission execution. Two completely different lots of money. But there is the matter of maintenance technicians time. Do we prioritize 1st line mission facilities or support facilities.
Larger projects are funded exclusively by NAF money. So no mission overlap.
Employees are once again paid through NAF funds. No mission overlap.
So while there’s a slight tension with mx technician time use, the money side is not really in tension.
Basically, the air force just doesn’t want to do it anymore.
Maintenance and small repairs can be made to hotels using the base Civil Engineer labor force. All of these costs are reimbursable from NAF to AF, so in the end the money actually still comes from NAF which has nothing to do with mission execution. Two completely different lots of money. But there is the matter of maintenance technicians time. Do we prioritize 1st line mission facilities or support facilities.
Larger projects are funded exclusively by NAF money. So no mission overlap.
Employees are once again paid through NAF funds. No mission overlap.
So while there’s a slight tension with mx technician time use, the money side is not really in tension.
Basically, the air force just doesn’t want to do it anymore.
Do these Air Force Inns fall under the installation command or something like the commissary where the civil engineers are restricted from maintenance/repairs? Is that installation commander having to choose between an F-35 squadron hangar or fixing dorms?
Maintenance and small repairs can be made to hotels using the base Civil Engineer labor force. All of these costs are reimbursable from NAF to AF, so in the end the money actually still comes from NAF which has nothing to do with mission execution. Two completely different lots of money. But there is the matter of maintenance technicians time. Do we prioritize 1st line mission facilities or support facilities.
Larger projects are funded exclusively by NAF money. So no mission overlap.
Employees are once again paid through NAF funds. No mission overlap.
So while there’s a slight tension with mx technician time use, the money side is not really in tension.
Basically, the air force just doesn’t want to do it anymore.
The dilemma is unbreakable when we don't have enough people to cover both the mission and key support. We will just be knocking back the alligator closest to the boat.
Yes and no. The dilemma is pretty much what you describe, but the decisions are made way above the installation level. HQ AF decides, for example, to reduce infrastructure maintenance budget, and with that, reduce civil engineer staffing. The installation commander is not shown the detail of these decisions or explained clearly what is happening or why. They are simply told to do their best with what they have. Which leads to endless wheel-spinning and futility.
For about 20 years, the USAF has not trusted installation commanders to make budget trade-offs. The presumption, likely accurate, is that they'd manicure operations to avoid making things impossible for everyone else. Given we do a lot of operating that isn't necessary and yields no upside but do it nonetheless because someone says so, O-6s being handed the reins would potentially reduce waste and free up a lot of money for support.
But we're now talking about a model for budget and ops prioritization that hasn't existed for a long time.
Tony, I find that most of the Air Forces leadership are pilots or other flying status Airmen. Do you think this bias towards operations and flying hours over time has degraded infrastructure and other parts of the Air Force?
I think there's something to it. I don't necessarily buy that it's because too many operators are in charge of support elements. Indeed, the trend after 9/11/01, fueled by Rumsfeld's hare-brained Joint Basing construct, has been support leaders in charge of whole bases with operations just a tenant unit like anyone else. Still, most generals 2-star and above come out of operations.
I think that's good and maybe even essential. Operators know what support they need to deliver. Support personnel don't always appreciate how their activities can boost or impair operations. The USAF's preference for stovepiped organizations has driven supporters further from the conceptual centerline of airpower, and re-drawn the old skirmish line between aviators and everyone else.
The real problem is the USAF promotes too few of the right people to senior roles where decisions requiring a backbone get made. Whether they wear wings or not, they're reaching the highest levels by proving they can politic, which means laying aside principles to adhere to someone else's demands and serve their interests ... even at the expense of the team you're leading.
Chopping infrastructure budgets didn't happen because there were too many pilots at the top. It happened because we promoted people who would say yes every time their string gets pulled. Suddenly they're at boardroom tables deciding how to pay a $100 infrastructure bill with $7-8. In that world, something has to be on fire to get funded. Which is why Al Udeid, for example, had to become a scandal with HASC/SASC sponsorship to get fixed.
You mentioned joint basing as a hare-brained scheme, could you expand? My initial impression is that joint basing, particularly airfields could offer cost savings. If USMC, USN, and USAF are operating their versions of the F35, there could be opportunities to offer improved maintenance and operational infrastructure. In my mind, joint Army and USMC bases could share live fire ranges, more manpower for maintenance and training, and joint training opportunities.
Do you find fault in support leaders maintaining installations while operational units focus on their own training and readiness? Could you expand on your experiences there?
Maintenance and small repairs can be made to hotels using the base Civil Engineer labor force. All of these costs are reimbursable from NAF to AF, so in the end the money actually still comes from NAF which has nothing to do with mission execution. Two completely different lots of money. But there is the matter of maintenance technicians time. Do we prioritize 1st line mission facilities or support facilities.
Larger projects are funded exclusively by NAF money. So no mission overlap.
Employees are once again paid through NAF funds. No mission overlap.
So while there’s a slight tension with mx technician time use, the money side is not really in tension.
Basically, the air force just doesn’t want to do it anymore.
Maintenance and small repairs can be made to hotels using the base Civil Engineer labor force. All of these costs are reimbursable from NAF to AF, so in the end the money actually still comes from NAF which has nothing to do with mission execution. Two completely different lots of money. But there is the matter of maintenance technicians time. Do we prioritize 1st line mission facilities or support facilities.
Larger projects are funded exclusively by NAF money. So no mission overlap.
Employees are once again paid through NAF funds. No mission overlap.
So while there’s a slight tension with mx technician time use, the money side is not really in tension.
Basically, the air force just doesn’t want to do it anymore.
Another example is privatized housing. What a joke.